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PREDICATIVISM ABOUT CLASSES
W hat are classes?
1 More precisely, what are the objects of the
second sort of second-order set theory? The objects of the
first sort are, of course, sets, but classes have sets as their
members and behave like sets. Allegedly, the subject matter of set theory
comprises all the collections there are. If classes are collections of any
kind, why can’t we just count them among the subject matter of set
theory? A plethora of paradoxes, however, teach us that many classes
are “proper” and cannot be sets. So, what are classes after all?
i. four competing views about classes
In the present paper, we will particularly consider the following four
prominent views about classes.
• Reductionism: Set theory need not take classes at face value, and
talk of classes in set theory can and should be reduced to talk
of sets.
• Plural interpretation: Classes are sub-pluralities of the set-theoretic
universe V.
• Mereological interpretation: Classes are mereological parts of V.
• Predicativism: Classes are predicates of sets.2
The theme of this article is predicativism. Predicativism in its modern
form is credited to Parsons.3 Nowadays, however, predicativism is often
1 I would like to thank Volker Halbach, Daniel Isaacson, Penelope Maddy, and Tim-
othy Williamson for insightful and helpful comments. I am indebted to Ali Enayat for
invaluable communications and information about the theory of satisfaction classes, and
to Neil Barton and Sy-David Friedman for answering my questions about their article.
I am deeply grateful to the two anonymous referees for very extensive comments and
helpful suggestions, which led to a considerable improvement of the article. Finally, I
would like to express my special thanks to Leon Horsten and Philip Welch for immensely
fruitful discussions on the topic of this article.
2We use the term ‘predicative’ in the (literal) sense of “having the quality of predicating
something” or “forming or having the function of a predicate” (OED) here and thus call
the view at issue “predicativism.” The term is, however, often used in philosophy and logic
with a technical (figurative) meaning, according to which something is called predicative
if it is defined, expressed, or constructed without quantification over domains that include
it. If one wants to reserve the term ‘predicative’ for the latter technical use, one could
alternatively call the view “predicationalism” or “predicational interpretation of classes.”
3Charles Parsons, “Sets and Classes,” in Mathematics in Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983), pp. 209–220.
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viewed negatively and sometimes even considered “obsolete” compared
to other relatively new views, such as the plural interpretation. The
aim of this article is to propose a form of predicativism that we call
liberal predicativism, and argue for it against the other three views in
light of recent developments in mathematical logic: a number of new
developments in the use of classes in set theory, as well as in theories
of classes per se, were recently made, and we think that it is a good time
to re-evaluate predicativism in light of them. Predicativism has been
considered too restrictive and unable to accommodate the use of classes
in modern set theory. Most of the criticisms against predicativism so
far are based on this diagnosis, but we will argue that it is true only
of a specific type of predicativism and does not apply to our liberal
predicativism. Our conclusion will be that predicativism is still a highly
viable option, and, in particular, our liberal predicativism provides a
suciently versatile and workable nominalist concept of classes for set
theory. We will explain predicativism in detail separately in §II, and in
the rest of this section we will briefly explain the other three views.
There are two dierent versions of reductionism. The first simply
identifies classes with formulae of the first-order language L∈ of set
theory (possibly with parameters). Accordingly, a membership state-
ment “a set x is a member of a class X ” means nothing but “Φ holds
for x” for the L∈-formula Φ identified with the class X ; quantification
over classes is then shorthand for meta-theoretic quantification over L∈-
formulae. Let us call this view denabilism about classes. For example,
the definabilist reads “every class of ordinals is well-founded” as the
following schematic (meta-theoretic) statement:
For all L∈-formula Φ, the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF (or whatever
theory of sets one adopts) proves that if Φ holds only for ordinals, then
there is a set x such that Φ holds for x but none of the members of x.
In other words, definabilism claims that all and only classes are first-
order definable in L∈. The second version of reductionism holds that
the content of statements involving classes, particularly those involv-
ing undefinable classes, should not be taken at face value, and these
statements should be understood as statements relativized to set-sized
structures of the form (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) for strongly inaccessible cardinals
κ (or ordinals κ of some specific kind). Let us call this view hermeneutic
reductionism about classes.
The plural interpretation of classes was proposed by Boolos, and it
takes classes as sub-pluralities of V.4 Uzquiano explains that the plural
4George Boolos, “To Be Is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some
Variables),” The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXIII, 8 (August 1984): 430–49.
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interpretation “construe[s] reference to classes not as singular reference
to gigantic collections other than sets, but rather as plural reference to
sets.”5 That is to say, the plural interpretation reads the second-order
quantifier ∃X of the second-order language L2∈ of set theory as “there
are some sets . . . ” and the membership relation x ∈ X as “x is one of
them,” where “them” refers to the plurality denoted by X . Accordingly,
“every class of ordinals is well-founded” is interpreted as follows:
Whenever there are some sets such that each of them is an ordinal, there
is a set such that it is one of them and every member of it is not one of
them.
The plural interpretation is the most significant nominalist competitor
of predicativism, and we will discuss it in more detail in §V in compar-
ison with predicativism.
The mereological interpretation was recently proposed by Welch and
Horsten.6 They introduced it to give a philosophical foundation and
content to Welch’s new set-theoretic principle called the global reection
principle (henceforth, GRP):
GRP There exist a class j and an ordinal κ such that j is an elementary
embedding from (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) to (V,∈,C) with a critical point κ,
where C is the domain of second-order quantifiers, that is, the collection
of all classes (mereological parts of V for them) there are.7 The mereo-
logical interpretation is manifestly a form of realism about classes and
takes classes as objects independent of sets, while the other three views
try to avoid ontological commitment to any object beyond sets even if
they adopt realism about sets.
There is another influential view besides the aforementioned four.
Potentialism about sets, which has its origin in the work of Zermelo,8
holds that the mathematical universe comprises an open-endedly and
inexhaustibly growing hierarchy of “normal domains” of set theory, and
5Gabriel Uzquiano, “Plural Quantification and Classes,” Philosophia Mathematica, XI,
1 (February 2003): 67–81, at p. 72.
6Philip Welch and Leon Horsten, “Reflecting on Absolute Infinity,” The Journal of
Philosophy, CXIII, 2 (February 2016): 89–111.
7The embedding asserted to exist by GRP is an embedding between second-order
structures, and dierent formulations of GRP are possible depending on what formulae
are required to be preserved thereby. In this article, we will focus on their “ocial” ver-
sion, called GRPΣ0∞ by them, which asserts that the embedding preserves all rst-order
formulae (possibly with class parameters).
8Ernst Zermelo, “On Boundary Numbers and Domains,” M. Hallett, trans., in
W. Ewald, From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundation of Mathematics, vol. 2
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 1208–33.
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quantification over sets must always be restricted to one fixed “normal
domain” among many others. Potentialism thereby identifies sets and
classes without falling into inconsistency by taking classes as subsets of
a fixed “normal domain,” which are in turn members of larger “normal
domains” at higher levels of the hierarchy. One problem of potentialism
is that it allows for too few assertions about absolutely all sets. Another
problem is that it requires an independent domain over which the “nor-
mal domains” are supposed to range, but we have had no established
mathematical theorization of such a domain.9 These problems gener-
ally apply to multiversism, which holds that there are more than one
set-theoretic universes that set theory concerns; in contrast, universism,
the counterview to multiversism, takes the set-theoretic universe as a
unique completed totality. We will not get into the ongoing debate be-
tween universism and multiversism, which is far from settled, and we
will exclude potentialism from the scope of this article. In what follows,
we presuppose universism and focus on those views about classes that
are compatible with universism, which include the four aforementioned
views; throughout this article, the symbol V will denote the single uni-
versist universe of sets.
ii. predicativism
Predicativism takes classes as predicates of sets. Parsons explains that
the basic intuition behind predicativism is that “the introduction of the
notion of class answers to a general need to generalize on predicate
places in the language.”10
II.1. Strict Predicativism. The first question to ask is what predicates of
sets should be counted among the domain of second-order quantifiers.
Parsons is not perfectly clear on this point, but he is often taken by other
philosophers to be committed to the view that class quantification is
substutitional quantification over L∈-formulae with parameters in terms
of the notion of truth of or satisfaction.11 Let us formally explain this,
essentially following Parsons’s own way.12 Either a truth predicate or a
satisfaction predicate serves our purpose; we adopt a truth predicate
9Zermelo called a theory of the domain of “normal domains” a meta-set theory. For a
detailed exposition of Zermelo’s view on his meta-set theory, see Hans-Dieter Ebbinghaus,
“Zermelo: Boundary Numbers and Domains of Sets Continued,” History and Philosophy
of Logic, XXVII, 4 (November 2006): 285–306.
10Parsons, “Sets and Classes,” op. cit., p. 211.
11For instance, Uzquiano, and Welch and Horsten, both construe Parsons in this way.
See Uzquiano, “Plural quantification and classes,” op. cit., p. 79, and Welch and Horsten,
“Reflecting on Absolute Infinity,” op. cit., p. 104.
12Parsons uses a theory of satisfaction equivalent to CT− in interpreting theories of
classes in the same way that the translation I below does. However, CT− does not prove
the I-translations of the second-order axioms of separation and replacement. Hence, we
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in this article because all the relevant technical details are found in the
existing literature.13 We first expand L∈ to a first-order language L+∈
by adding a truth predicate T . The predicate T takes names of L∈-
sentences with parameters as its arguments, and thus we presuppose a
suitable coding scheme of the language L∞∈ = L∈ ∪ {ca | a ∈ V} with
constant symbols ca for all sets a ∈ V; thereby, we can express a formula
ϕ(x, b) with a parameter b being true of a by saying that T holds for the
code of the L∞∈ -sentence ϕ(ca, cb). We define an L+∈ -theory CT
− as an
extension of ZF with the axioms asserting the usual Tarskian inductive
clauses, such as “an atomic formula x ∈ y is true of a and b if and only
if a is indeed a member of b” and “for every L∞∈ -sentence σ, ¬σ is true
if and only if σ is not true.” We further extend CT− with the following
two axioms SepT and ReplT (not axiom schemes!):
SepT For all L∞∈ -formulae ϕ(x) with exactly one free variable and for
all sets a, there is a set b such that b = {d ∈ a | ϕ is true of d};
ReplT For all L∞∈ -formulae ϕ(x, y) with exactly two free variables and
for all sets a, if {〈d0, d1〉 | ϕ is true of d0 ∈ a and d1} defines a
function, then its range is a set;
that is to say, they are truth-theoretic expressions of the second-order ax-
ioms of separation and replacement. We call the resulting theory CT0.
We can easily verify that CT0 interprets the Von Neumann-Bernays-
Gödel theory NBG of classes by translating ∀X into “for all L∞∈ -
formulae with one free variable” and x ∈ X into “the L∞∈ -formula X is
true of x”; we will denote this translation of L2∈ into L+∈ by I. Further-
more, CT0 has the same L∈-theorems as NBG does.14 What we call strict
predicativism holds that every theory S of classes is to be understood
in terms of its translation I(S); for strict predicativists, NBG actually
means CT0 (= CT0+I(NBG)), and every class theory S extending NBG
means CT0 + I(S). Note that strict predicativism transforms the ordi-
nary two-sorted formalism of class theories into a one-sorted formalism
by means of a truth predicate.
Both strict predicativism and definabilism intend to limit the range
of classes to those definable or expressible in L∈, but they are dierent
change Parsons’s setting and use CT0 instead of CT−. This change makes no essential
dierence to the discussion, since CT− + I(NBG) is identical with CT0 anyway.
13For example, see Kentaro Fujimoto, “Classes and Truths in Set Theory,” Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic, CLXIII, 11 (November 2012): 1484–1523.
14This equivalence of CT0 and NBG can be shown by the technique developed by
Enayat and Visser: see Ali Enayat and Albert Visser, “New Constructions of Satisfac-
tion Classes,” in Theodora Achourioti et al. eds., Unifying the Philosophy of Truth (Berlin:
Springer, 2015), pp. 321–35.
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in two important respects. First, as opposed to definabilism, strict pred-
icativism does not aim to eliminate reference to classes and it allows
quantification over classes. Second, in model-theoretic terms, definabil-
ism and strict predicativism coincide over ω-models of set theory, but
they diverge over non-ω-models. Non-ω-models contain (codes of) non-
standard L∈-formulae, and the truth of such formulae can by no means
be expressed in definabilism (also see fn 18).
II.2. Liberal Predicativism. Despite the widespread reading of Parsons,
we doubt that Parsons indeed commits himself to strict predicativism
because he also writes,
[T]here is a sense in which the theory of classes is more general than the
theory of satisfaction. . . . Even if we think of classes as always the exten-
sion of predicates, the axioms of [NBG] would allow them to be extensions
of predicates in any language, whether we can now specify it or not, pro-
vided they are closed under first-order logical operations. . . . The usual
satisfaction theory [CT0] lacks this generality because it is based on the
syntax of the language of [ZF].15
The form of predicativism that we propose is based on this alternative
version of predicativism at which Parsons hints in the above passage.
We retain the core doctrine that classes are predicates, but we do not
restrict those predicates to any fixed language. As we will see in more
detail in §III, modern set theory makes substantial use of classes that
are not L∈-definable. The main problem of strict predicativism (as well
as definabilism) consists in that it is formally incompatible with the
use of those undefinable classes in set theory. We aim to overcome this
defect of strict predicativism by “liberating” predicates from the strict
predicativist constraint and allowing the introduction of a wide range
of undefinable predicates as classes.
Of course, there are predicates that we should not add to our the-
ory of sets; for example, we should not add a predicate that defines a
cofinal map from ω to the class of ordinals. Let us call a predicate of
sets admissible when it can be justifiably postulated or introduced to set
theory as a definite mathematical predicate subsumed under the laws
of set theory. We propose that those admissible predicates compose the
domain of second-order quantifiers as the subject matter of class theory.
Our proposal is to interpret the quantifier ∃X as “there exists an
admissible predicate such that . . . ” or “there is a predicate we may ad-
missibly introduce such that . . . ” and interpret the membership relation
x ∈ X as “the predicate X holds for x.” Accordingly, “every class of or-
dinals is well-founded” is read as follows:
15Parsons, “Sets and Classes”, op. cit., pp. 215–16.
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No matter what predicate we admissibly introduce, if it holds only for
ordinals, then there is an ∈-minimal x such that the predicate holds for x.
We call this view liberal predicativism about classes. In contrast to strict
predicativism, liberal predicativism preserves the ordinary two-sorted
formalism of class theory. This interpretation of classes is not to be
expressed as a theory of truth or satisfaction because we want to keep
the domain of admissible predicates unrestricted to any formula of any
particular language with any particular interpretation; otherwise, we
would have to exclude all the classes from set theory that are not de-
finable in terms of the specific predicates of a fixed language, and the
resulting picture would be too restrictive for the actual practice of set
theory, as we will see in §III.16
A general characterization of the notion of admissibility of set-
theoretic predicates is expected to be dicult. What predicates are ad-
missible depends on the view one holds about sets and the universe of
sets. For example, for those who believe V = L, an (undefinable) pred-
icate that defines a non-trivial elementary embedding from some inner
model to V is not admissible; in contrast, if one holds the view that V is
so rich that it has a non-trivial elementary substructure, then she may
well want to introduce such a predicate for expressing her view. The
predicativism about classes discussed in this article is a particular view
about what classes are. The particular conception of classes it upholds
gives partial guidance about what classes should and should not exist,
but it does not solely determine exactly what classes exist. The latter
question is also about the admissibility of predicates (for proponents of
liberal predicativism) and is to be answered by a comprehensive con-
sideration of set theory as a whole. As we will see later, a second-order
axiom of set theory is often derived from a particular view about the
universe of sets and/or sets themselves, and one view behind one ax-
iom may be incompatible with another view behind another axiom. The
questions of which view on the universe V of sets is correct, and what
16There is, however, an alternative formalization of the idea of liberal predicativism
that renders theories of classes as theories of truth or satisfaction by interpreting a class as
a formula of an expansion L of L∞∈ with innitely many completely uninterpreted predicates;
this alternative is hinted at in Parsons, “Sets and Classes,” op. cit., p. 216. This approach
does not suer from the ω-inconsistency phenomenon that we will discuss below, and it
may appeal more to those who accept the Quinean criterion of objecthood, which we will
discuss in §V, because it involves no second-order quantifiers on the face of it. However,
we think that this approach only disguises second-order quantifiers because it requires
a delineation of the range of possible interpretations those uninterpreted predicates can
receive, which seems to mean nothing but the range of admissible predicates; it also
results in a technically unnatural and unnecessarily cumbersome formalism. We do not
get into the details here, but some details will be discussed in Kentaro Fujimoto, “On
Parsons’s Predicative Interpretation of Classes,” in preparation.
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axioms are adequate for set theory, are far from settled. We will give
some sample cases of liberal predicativist justifications of second-order
axioms of set theory, which suces anyway for our current purpose of
providing a predicative interpretation of classes with suciently rich
mathematical consequences, but we do not mean that only those pred-
icates are admissible, and we would like to leave open which predicates
are admissible. In particular, we would like to emphasize that we do
not intend in this article to propose any particular single formal system
as the system of liberal predicativism.17
II.3. Impredicative Comprehension. We end this section by discussing
one general limitation of predicativism. For a collection Γ of L2∈-
formulae, the Γ-comprehension axiom (henceforth, Γ-CA) is an axiom
scheme asserting
∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ Φ(x)), for all Φ belonging to Γ.
The collections Π1n and Σ
1
n of L2∈-formulae (n ∈ N) are standardly de-
fined; in particular, Π10- and Σ
1
0-formulae are those with no second-order
quantifier but possibly with second-order parameters, and we call them
elementary formulae; the familiar Morse-Kelley class theory MK is de-
fined as NBG + {Σ1n-CA | n ∈ N}. Following the convention, although
this is slightly confusing because our theme is predicativism, we call a
formula not equivalent to an elementary one impredicative.
It is often argued that predicativism is incompatible with impred-
icative comprehension, namely, Γ-CA for a collection Γ containing im-
predicative formulae. Indeed, strict predicativism is ω-inconsistent with
impredicative comprehension, since an extension of CT0 with the ex-
tended arithmetical induction scheme for arbitrary L+∈ -formulae is in-
consistent with I(Σ11-CA). This can be shown as follows: Σ11-CA pro-
duces a truth class X in the sense that (V,∈,X ) is a model of CT0;
hence, if classes are L∞∈ -formulae as strict predicativism holds, then we
have an L∞∈ -formula X that renders a truth predicate for L∞∈ ; next, by
means of the extended arithmetical induction, we can show by induc-
tion on the complexity of L∞∈ -sentences that
for all L∞∈ -sentences σ, X is true of the code of σ, if and only if σ is true;
17 In proof theory, the term “predicativism” is often used with the technical “figurative”
meaning (in the sense of fn 2) and refers to a particular view about what sets of natural
numbers exist; it claims that there only exist sets of natural numbers that belong to the
ramified hierarchy (of sets of natural numbers) up to the Feferman-Schütte ordinal Γ0.
One could meaningfully apply this idea to the current context and claim that there only
exist classes that can be constructed by a transfinite iteration of elementary comprehen-
sion. However, this would result in the exclusion of many classes in use in set theory, such
as a class of ordinal indiscernibles, that transcend those “predicative” classes.
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finally, by diagonalization (carried out within the truth predicate), we
obtain an L∞∈ -sentence λ such that
X is not true of the code of λ, if and only if λ is true,
from which we can draw a contradiction by a simple “liar” argument.18
This ω-inconsistency results exactly from the restriction on classes to
predicates of the specific language L∈.19
What about liberal predicativism? It is ω-consistent with impredica-
tive comprehension, but we suspect that liberal predicativism is not
conceptually coherent with, nor can it justify, impredicative compre-
hension. We can think of whatever L2∈-formula as defining a predicate,
but it may not be admissible. Hence, impredicative comprehension re-
quires a justification of the admissibility of predicates whose satisfaction
conditions are specified in terms of quantification over all admissible
predicates. Then we face a familiar challenge: do we have a determinate
totality of admissible predicates? The following passage from Parsons
indicates that his answer would be negative, with which we agree:
[I]t seems evident that the “totality” of possible predicates is irremediably
potential . . . . To what extent can we regard such possibilities as determi-
nate at any given point? It seems that we have no conception of a totality of
all possible languages and interpretations on the basis of which we might
claim such determinacy.20
A problem of the lack of a determinate totality of admissible predi-
cates is that impredicative statements may then not have definite truth
values. Admissible predicates ought to be justifiably introduced into set
18 Interestingly, the existence of a truth class is ω-inconsistent but consistent with strict
predicativism. Smith showed that a recursively saturated countable model of PA can
have a truth class, say, X , and (a code of) a nonstandard arithmetical formula ϕ such
that {n ∈ N | ϕ is true of n in terms of X} defines another truth class; it is folklore that
his result can be generalized to the claim that there is a non-ω-model of CT0 in which
{n ∈ V | ϕ is true of a (in terms of the default truth predicate T of CT0)} is a truth
class for some nonstandard ϕ. See Stuart Smith, “Nonstandard Definability,” Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic, XLII, 1 (March 1989): 21–43. In contrast, the existence of a truth
class is simply inconsistent with definabilism by Tarski’s undefinability theorem, since
definabilism renders classes as standard L∈-formulae.
19Here we present only the simplest type of derivation of ω-inconsistency to avoid
unnecessary technical complication. There are dierent types of derivations of ω-
inconsistency from dierent types of axioms. For instance, the proofs of ω-inconsistency
mentioned in fn 23 and fn 34 are both dierent from the one illustrated here. However,
these ω-inconsistency phenomena share the same root: they are all caused by the use
of classes that are not L∈-definable. The details of the proofs of those ω-inconsistency
results (of strict predicativism) asserted in this article will be included in Fujimoto, “On
Parsons’s Predicative Interpretation of Classes,” op. cit.
20Parsons, “Sets and Classes,” op. cit., p. 217.
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theory as a definite mathematical predicate subsumed under the laws
of set theory. In particular, each of them is expected to have a definite
truth value for each set as its argument; for instance, the axiom of sepa-
ration asserts that {x ∈ a | P(x)} is a set, where P demarcates the set a
into two parts by prescribing which x ∈ a is a member of this set or not,
and, if P were indefinite, it would fail to give a definite demarcation,
and it would be hard to justify that {x ∈ a | P(x)} picks a unique set,
which is a mathematically definite entity.21 Hence, if a predicate P lacks
a definite satisfaction condition, then P is deemed to be inadmissible.
Our lack of a conception of a determinate totality of admissible pred-
icates might only be due to our epistemic or conceptual limitation and
not necessarily imply the, say, metaphysical non-existence of such a to-
tality or the semantic indeterminacy of impredicative assertions. How-
ever, even if there is a determinate totality of admissible predicates
and if impredicative statements have definite truth values, impredica-
tive comprehension is still highly controversial. How can we justify and
on what ground can we postulate that such a totality of admissible
predicates, which transcends our epistemic or conceptual capacity, has
a desired structure that validates impredicative comprehension and rea-
soning? In particular, the notion of admissibility concerns the justifia-
bility of the introduction of predicates and thus is a metamathematical
notion in some sense. Then, how can we justify that an impredicative
predicate partly defined in terms of such a metamathematical notion
can be justifiably introduced as a definite mathematical predicate? It
would be a highly non-trivial (and seemingly dicult) task to answer
these questions in favor of impredicative comprehension.
In conclusion, it appears that impredicative comprehension is not
generally congruent with the idea of liberal predicativism. Nonethe-
less, we want to emphasize that the argument so far does not imply
that every impredicative statement is meaningless or unjustifiable with
liberal predicativism. For instance, each instance of the axiom scheme
Π10-CA of NBG is a Π12-statement, but Π10-CA just expresses that admis-
sible predicates are closed under first-order logical operations, which is
perfectly acceptable for liberal predicativism.
We would welcome a convincing argument that justifies impredica-
tive comprehension from the liberal predicativist point of view, but we
are rather pessimistic about the existence of such an argument (also see
§V). One of the main points of this article is that, even if we compromise
21For the same reason, liberal predicativism does not seem to be congruent with the
idea of extending the axiom scheme of separation to arbitrary L2∈-formulae.
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to give up impredicative comprehension, we can still have plausible jus-
tifications of class-theoretic principles strong enough to accommodate
the use of classes in modern set theory.
iii. the use of and need for classes in set theory
In this section, we will consider two desiderata for an appropriate inter-
pretation of classes and argue that definabilism and strict predicativism
fail to meet them and should be abandoned. The argument uses sev-
eral concrete examples, with respect to which the two views fail to meet
the desiderata, and we will later show in subsequent sections that, by
contrast, liberal predicativism accommodates them well. We will also
see at the end of this section that these examples also suggest some
problems of hermeneutic reductionism. Throughout the following dis-
cussion, every theory of classes is assumed to include NBG.
The first desideratum is: (i) an appropriate interpretation of classes
should not trivialize highly regarded mathematical theorems in set the-
ory nor set-theoretic axioms under serious consideration in set theory.
We will see three examples with respect to which definabilism and/or
strict predicativism fail to meet this desideratum.
Example 1. Kunen proved that every elementary embedding from V
into itself is trivial if V is a model of ZFC, and this theorem raised
a prominent open problem, asking whether the same holds without
assuming AC in V.22 Now, the definabilist reads Kunen’s theorem as
(1) If an L∈-formula ϕ(x, y) possibly with parameters defines an ele-
mentary embedding from V into itself in ZFC, then this elemen-
tary embedding is trivial,
and construes the open problem as asking whether (1) still holds
when we replace ZFC with ZF. Suzuki gave a purely elementary proof
of (1), and his proof also gives an armative answer to the defin-
abilist reading of the open problem.23 However, his proof is usually
not counted as an alternative proof to Kunen’s theorem, and his re-
sult is not regarded as the answer to the open problem either. This
reaction to Suzuki’s result from set-theorists seems to indicate that
22Kenneth Kunen, “Elementary Embeddings and Infinitary Combinatorics,” The Jour-
nal of Symbolic Logic, XXXVI, 3 (September, 1971): 407–413.
23Akira Suzuki, “No Elementary Embedding from V into V Is Definable from Param-
eters,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, LXIV, 4 (December 1999): 1591–1594. As a matter of
fact, Suzuki’s proof can also be modified into an “elementary” proof of the ω-inconsistency
of the strict predicativist interpretations of Kunen’s theorem and the open problem.
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set-theorists do not identify Kunen’s theorem with (1), and definabil-
ism is not accepted in the community of set-theorists.24
Example 2. GRP implies that the critical point κ of the postulated
elementary embedding j is strongly inaccessible, and thus there is
X ⊂ Vκ with (Vκ,∈,X ) |= CT0; therefore, GRP yields a truth class
j(X ) and thus is ω-inconsistent with the strict predicative interpre-
tation of classes. Hence, the strict predicative interpretation trivially
refutesWelch’sGRP as an appropriate axiom of set theory. With defin-
abilism, in turn, we simply cannot express GRP because the match-up
between Vκ+1 and C cannot be expressed.
Example 3. Vickers and Welch proved that if there is a proper class
I of good indiscernibles for (V,∈), then there are an inner model M
and an elementary embedding j from M into V with a critical point
both definable in (V,∈, I ).25 Suzuki’s aforementioned theorem can
be strengthened to the L∈-undefinability of such a pair of M and j as
well as to the ω-inconsistency of the existence of such a pair with strict
predicativism (cf. fn 23). Hence, definabilism and strict predicativism
trivialize, or significantly impair the value of, the theorem.26
The second desideratum is: (ii) an appropriate interpretation of
classes should provide a mathematical framework in which (or, at least,
should be compatible with mathematical presuppositions under which)
widely accepted and/or mathematically fruitful uses of classes in set
theory can be meaningfully expressed and implemented. We will see
two examples below in which definabilism and/or strict predicativism
fail to meet this desideratum.
Example 4. Audrito and Viale recently proposed new axioms of set
theory, called iterated resurrection axioms, and a new notion of large
cardinal, called an (α)-uplifting cardinal, for an ordinal α, which bear
significant implications for generic absoluteness.27 Both are defined in
24The common view on Kunen’s theorem among set-theorists seems to be hermeneutic
reductionism or a variant of hermeneutic reductionism that takes the real content of the
theorem not as what it literally states but as various consequences of its proof collectively,
such as the non-existence of an elementary embedding from Vδ+2 into itself for any δ.
25 John Vickers and Philip Welch, “On Elementary Embeddings from an Inner Model
to the Universe,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, LXVI, 3 (September 2001): 1090–1116.
26Actually, a truth class can be easily defined in terms of a proper class I of good
indiscernibles for (V,∈), from which the L∈-undefinability and the ω-inconsistency at
issue readily follow without appealing to Suzuki’s theorem.
27Giorgio Audrito and Matteo Viale, “Absoluteness via Resurrection,” The Journal of
Mathematical Logic, XVII, 2 (December 2017): 36 pages.
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terms of the existence of a winning strategy for a certain clopen class
game. Hence, the determinacy of clopen class games is a natural pre-
supposition for investigating them. However, Gitman and Hamkins
proved that the determinacy of clopen class games is not provable in
NBG and is actually equivalent modulo NBG to the axiom of elemen-
tary transnite recursion (henceforth, ETR), which asserts that every
elementary recursive definition along any well-founded class relation
has a solution.28 Hence, a natural background theory for the iterated
resurrection axioms and (α)-uplifting cardinals is the class theory
NBG + ETR, but I(ETR) is ω-inconsistent with CT0 because ETR
yields a truth class; with definabilism, ETR is simply false.29
Example 5. Friedman proposed a new axiom of set theory called
the Inner Model Hypothesis (henceforth, IMH ):
IMH If a sentence ϕ holds in an inner model of some outer model
of V, then it already holds in some inner model of V.30
This axiom is intended to assert that the set-theoretic universe V
is maximally rich in some sense. Antos et al. formulate a universist
reading of IMH using class-theoretic machinery, which is meant to
express that the truth in any “ideal” possible inner model can be
realized in an inner model of the real actual universe.31 A crucial
technical diculty in formulating this idea is that we have no means
to directly refer to “ideal” outer models of V. To circumvent this
diculty, they introduce the notion of V-logic, a deductive system for
languages extending LV∈ := L∞∈ ∪{V} with a new predicate symbol V
for V, which contains, besides other axioms and rules, an infinitary
inference rule called the V-rule:
V-rule If a formula ϕ(x) holds for ca for all a ∈ V, we can infer
(∀x ∈ V)ϕ(x).
Thereby, they reformulate IMH in terms of the consistency of theories
in V-logic:
28Victoria Gitman and Joel Hamkins, “Open Determinacy for Class Games,” in Andres
E. Caicedo et al. eds., Foundations of Mathematics: Logic at Harvard: Essays in Honor of Hugh
Woodin’s 60th Birthday (American Mathematical Society, 2016), pp. 121–144.
29As a matter of fact, regardless of the assumption of ETR, the existence of an (ω)-
uplifting cardinal is contradictory in itself with the definabilist interpretation, since the
asserted existence of a winning strategy implies the existence of a truth class (in NBG);
similarly, the assertion is ω-inconsistent with the strict predicativist interpretation; see
Kentaro Fujimoto, “An (ω)-uplifting cardinal is not first-order definable,” submitted.
30Sy-David Friedman, “Internal Consistency and Inner Model Hypothesis,” The Bul-
letin of Symbolic Logic, XII, 4 (December 2006): 591–600.
31Carolin Antos, Neil Barton, and Sy-David Friedman, “Universism and Extensions of
V”: preprint available from https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.05751.
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IMH `V If a V-logic theory T satisfying some condition and a first-
order sentence ϕ are consistent in V-logic, then there is an
inner model of V satisfying ϕ.
They justify this reformulation by appealing to a certain type of com-
pleteness theorem, which informally says that if T is consistent in V-
logic then there is an extension (“outer model”) of V satisfying T.32
Since derivations in V-logic may be of proper class size, they need
a theory of classes rich enough to talk about V-logic and its conse-
quences, and they choose NBG+Σ11-CA as such. However, as we have
seen, Σ11-CA is ω-inconsistent with strict predicativism.
33
We have seen that definabilism and strict predicativism fail to accom-
modate the use of classes in modern set theory and do not meet the
two desiderata, as shown by the five examples above.34 Now, what about
hermeneutic reductionism? Both Kunen’s theorem and Vickers and
Welch’s theorem hold in (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) for any strongly inaccessible κ;
since almost all class-theoretic arguments in set theory are given within
some class theory, such as MK, satisfiable in (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1), we can safely
say that theorems in class theory are automatically transformed into
theorems relativized to (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1). However, when it comes to pos-
tulation of axioms, hermeneutic reductionism often renders an axiom
involving classes as something inequivalent and unintended. Firstly, an
axiom formulated in terms of classes and its hermeneutic reduction-
ist interpretation, such as the assertion of the existence of a models of
the axiom of the form (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) for a strongly inaccessible κ, of-
ten have dierent consistency strengths: the existence of a cardinal κ
with (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) |= GRP has higher consistency strength than GRP
(modulo, say, MK), for example, and the same applies to the iterated
32More precisely, they assume, besides the derivability relation in V-logic, the exis-
tence of a class X that “codes” the least admissible structure Hyp(V) containing V as its
element, and then they construct countable “copies” M and N of V and Hyp(V) by a re-
flection (and collapsing) argument; thereby, the consistency of T in V-logic is transfered
to the consistency in M -logic (namely, V-logic in the sense of M ) in N and then some
model of T is obtained by Barwise’s M-completeness theorem: see Barwise, Admissible
Sets and Structures (Berlin: Springer, 1975), Chapter III.3.
33The notion of consistency (or derivability) in V-logic is not L∈-definable in itself,
since a truth predicate could otherwise be defined by defining “an L∞∈ -sentence ϕ is true”
as “¬ϕV is inconsistent (or ϕV is derivable) in V-logic from no premises,” where ϕV is
the result of restricting all quantifiers in ϕ to V.
34Another interesting example is an axiom asserting that the class Ord of ordinals is
“weakly compact” (in the sense that Ord has the tree property). Enayat showed that this
axiom implies (and is equiconsistent with) the existence of n-Mahlo cardinals for every
standard natural number n; see Ali Enayat, “Set Theory with a Class of Indiscernibles,”
unpublished manuscript. This axiom is also ω-inconsistent with strict predicativism.
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resurrection axioms, IMH `V , and the definition of (α)-uplifting cardi-
nal.35 Secondly, and more importantly, those axioms are intended to
be about the entire universe, but the hermeneutic reductionist takes
them to be assertions about a particular set structure. What we learn
from Examples 2, 4, and 5 is that there are some proposed axioms of
set theory under serious consideration that intend to assert something
about the entire universe and crucially rely upon reference to (undefin-
able) proper classes. Thirdly, furthermore, an axiom involving classes
sometimes have dierent logical consequences than its relativization
to (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) has. For instance, for a strongly inaccessible κ, while
it is well known that κ having the partition property, κ → (κ)n2 for
all n < ω, is equivalent to κ having the tree property, both of which
are second-order assertions on (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) and equivalent to κ being
weakly compact, Enayat showed that the assertion that the class Ord
of ordinals has the same partition property is not equivalent (in NBG)
to the assertion that Ord has the tree property.36 Thus, hermeneutic
reductionism does not appear to us an appropriate option, if one takes
those second-order axioms of set theory seriously.
iv. how much can we do with liberal predicativism?
The class-theoretic principles mentioned in Examples 1–5 essentially
require undefinable classes, and the ω-inconsistency of strict predica-
tivism with those principles is exactly caused by the restriction of pred-
icates to definable ones. Liberal predicativism overcomes this problem
by allowing a variety of undefinable predicates. With liberal predica-
tivism, predicates (as classes) need not be definable, and we may intro-
duce new predicates by providing them with adequate axiomatic speci-
fications or characterizations, such as “P is a such and such elementary
embedding” and “Q is a such and such truth predicate.” In this way, we
can enrich our vocabulary and tools for investigating the universe of
sets. In this section, we will give three samples of liberal predicativist
justifications of class-theoretic principles beyond NBG.
To begin with, we will argue that some weak instances of impredica-
tive comprehension are justifiable with liberal predicativism. Consider
the next principle, called the ∆11-Comprehension Rule (which is not an
axiom but an inference rule):
∆11-CR For all Φ ∈ Σ11 and Ψ ∈ Π11, if ∀x(Φ(x)↔ Ψ(x)) is proved, then
we may infer ∃X∀x(x ∈ X ↔ Φ(x)).
35This situation is parallel to the inequivalence of Vopěnka’s principle and the exis-
tence of a Vopěnka cardinal, for example.
36Enayat, “Set Theory with a Class of Indiscernibles,” op. cit.
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Suppose the premise holds for Φ(x) ∈ Σ11 and Ψ(x) ∈ Π11. We take this
to mean that one has established that the equivalence of Φ and Ψ invari-
ably holds in every possible circumstance in which all the statements
about sets and classes one has accepted (and all their logical conse-
quences) are satisfied. Each such “circumstance” can be represented by
a triple (V,∈, C) for some collection C of admissible predicates such
that (V,∈, C) is a model of the set S of the axioms that one has ac-
cepted and the theorems that one has proved. Recall that universism is
presupposed throughout this article, and thus the domain V of sets and
the membership relation on them are invariable; hence, we will denote
(V,∈, C) by its only varying part C for simplicity. Assume that one is
working with a collection C of the admissible predicates that one has
already introduced; C should be a model of S, and thus Φ and Ψ are
equivalent in C. Every Σ11-assertion is upward persistent with respect
to second-order structures with the same first-order domain. Hence, on
the one hand, if Φ is satisfied in C, then Φ continues to be satisfied in
any model D of S expanding C by whatever new admissible predicates;
on the other hand, if Φ is not satisfied in C, then the Σ11-assertion ¬Ψ
is satisfied in C and thus continues to be satisfied, and so does ¬Φ by
the supposition, in any model D of S expanding C. Consequently, one
has only to look at the admissible predicates in the given C and need
not take into account any unknown potentially admissible predicates
for determining the truth value of Φ(x), which is invariable throughout
every expansion of C by further admissible predicates. This argument
seems to give a reasonable justification of ∆11-CR from the liberal pred-
icativist point of view. Unfortunately, NBG+∆11-CR is conservative over
NBG and does not prove, say, ETR.37 However, if one further postulates
the scheme of arithmetical induction (ω-induction) for all L2∈-formulae,
which seems acceptable even for liberal predicativists, we can show the
existence of an admissible predicate that parametrizes any finite level
or even some transfinite level (below ωω) of the ramified hierarchy or,
equivalently, of the Tarskian hierarchy of typed truths over V.38
A liberal predicative justification of any stronger instances of impred-
icative comprehension seems dicult. As we have explained, the idea of
liberal predicativism seems to be nearly intrinsically incompatible with
37See Fujimoto, “Classes and Truths in Set Theory,” op. cit., Theorem 15.
38The proof is the same as the proof of the corresponding fact in second-order arith-
metic. For an ordinal α, a class X parametrizing the α-th level of the Tarskian hierarchy
over V can be formally expressed as (V,∈,X ) being a model of the theory RTα of rami-
fied truth; see Fujimoto, “Classes and Truths in Set Theory,” op. cit., Definition 35. ∆11-CR
plus full ω-induction for L2∈ is still short of ETR but strong enough to make the notion
of an (ω)-uplifting cardinal expressible, for example.
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impredicative comprehension. However, liberal predicativism is not an
attempt to gain mathematical richness by means of impredicative com-
prehension; many undefinable classes in use in set theory cannot be
defined even with the help of full impredicative comprehension any-
way. One principal point of liberal predicativism is that it allows us to
freely (but admissibly) introduce any predicate that can be axiomat-
ically characterized. We have just mentioned the Tarskian hierarchy
of typed truths, and a truth predicate itself is another example of a
likely admissible predicate. An idea behind the admissibility of a truth
predicate is the so-called “implicit commitment” in the acceptance of
a formal theory: if one accepts a formal mathematical theory S, then
one is implicitly committed to accepting a number of further mathe-
matical principles, objects, and predicates that are not contained in S,
and among them is a truth predicate for S in particular. If one accepts
a theory S, then one is implicitly committed to the truth of S and to
a truth predicate for the language of S for the sake of expressing the
truth of S. This thought leads us to successively accept more and more
truth predicates in the Tarskian hierarhy, and it seems fairly reasonable
to accept and admissibly introduce a predicate that parametrizes the
Tarskian hierarchy along any ordinal and even along any class well-
ordering. The resulting axiom, asserting that there is an admissible
predicate parametrizing the Tarskian hierarchy along any class well-
ordering, is actually equivalent to ETR modulo NBG.39 This seems to
give a liberal predicativist justification of ETR.
By making use of a truth predicate richer than the Tarskian typed
one, we can justify even stronger class-theoretic principles than ETR.
Many of Feferman’s works were concerned with the aforementioned
problem of “implicit commitment,” and he proposed his theory KF of
untyped truth in an attempt to answer what we are implicitly committed
to in accepting a theory S and what we can justifiably accept on the
same fundamental ground as our initial acceptance of S.40 Following
Feferman’s idea, we suggest that, in accepting an admissible predicate
P , we can admissibly introduce an untyped truth predicate T , in the
sense of KF, for the language LT (P) := L∈∪{T ,P}. Putting L∞T (P) :=
L∞∈ ∪{P ,T }, this is formally expressed by the the following axiom KF:
KF For every class X , there is a class Y such that the LT (P)-
structure (V,∈,X ,Y ), where P and T are interpreted by X and
39For the precise definition of the axiom and the proof of the stated theorem, see
Gitman and Hamkins, “Open Determinacy for Class Games,” op. cit., Theorem 9.
40Solomon Feferman, “Reflecting on Incompleteness,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
LVI, 1 (March 1991): 1–49.
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Y , respectively, satisfies the following (namely, the axioms of KF
with two basic predicates ∈ and P):
(K1) Px is true (or false) of a, if and only if Pa (¬Pa, resp.);
(K2) x ∈ y is true (or false) of a and b, if and only if a ∈ b
(a 6∈ b, resp.);
(K3) An L∞T (P)-sentence σ is true, if and only if Tx is true of
the code of σ;
(K4) An L∞T (P)-sentence σ is true, if and only if ¬¬σ is true;
(K5) An L∞T (P)-sentence σ ∧ τ is true (or false), if and only if
both σ and τ are true (either σ or τ is false, resp.);
(K6) An L∞T (P)-sentence ∀xϕ(x) is true (or false), if and only
if ϕ(x) is true of all sets a (ϕ(x) is false of some a, resp.);
here, by “σ is false” we mean “¬σ is true,” and by “an L∞T -formula ϕ(x)
is true of a” we mean that the code of ϕ(ca) is a member of Y , namely,
the interpretation of the truth predicate T in the LT (P)-structure in
question. We emphasize that the postulates (K1)–(K6) for the admissi-
ble truth predicate Y involve no second-order quantification.
Now, let LFP be a class-theoretic principle asserting that there is
a least fixed-point of each elementary formula Φ(x,X ) with all occur-
rences of X positive (and possibly with set and/or class parameters).
The importance of LFP in the current context consists in that it enables
us to express IMH `V (in Example 5), since the notion of consequence
in V-logic can be inductively defined on V.41 Now, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. NBG + KF proves LFP and ETR.42
41Furthermore, NBG+LFP yields a class that “codes” Hyp(V), namely, the least admis-
sible structure containing V as a “set”; see Kentaro Fujimoto, “Truths, Inductive Defini-
tions, and Kripke-Platek Systems over Set Theory,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, LXXXIII,
3 (September 2018): 868-98. As far as we can see, the relevant arguments of Antos et al.
in justification of IMH`V , such as those mentioned in fn 32, can be thereby carried out
in NBG + LFP, which derives ETR, and the full strength of Σ11-CA is not necessary.
42We first see NBG+KF ` FP, where FP asserts the existence of a fixed-point of every
positive elementary operator. This is shown by a generalization of Corollary 3.11 of
Andrea Cantini, “Notes on Formal Theories of Truth,” Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik
und Grundlagen der Mathematik, XXXV, 2 (1989): 97–130. Then, the first claim follows
from Sato’s theorem that NBG + FP ` LFP: see Kentaro Sato, “Full and Hat Inductive
Definitions Are Equivalent in NBG,” Archive for Mathematical Logic, LIV, 1-2 (February
2015): 75–112. Finally, it is readily seen that NBG + LFP ` ETR, and the second claim
thereby follows. In second-order arithmetic, LFP is equivalent to Σ11-CA, and KF is far
weaker than LFP, but this equivalence breaks down in class theory, and the strength of
LFP comes down to that of KF, primarily because the notion of well-foundedness is no
longer Π11-complete in class theory.
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As a consequence, we have a liberal predicativist justification of the
class-theoretic principles presupposed in the set-theoretic arguments in
Examples 4 and 5.43 Hence, the common criticism of predicativism as
too restrictive only applies to strict predicativism and not to our liberal
predicativism.
The type of justification of axioms exhibited so far is based on a
general consideration of the mathematical act of introducing a new
predicate of one’s subject matter, which is not particular to set theory.44
This “generic” type of justification is not likely to be applicable to some
other axioms mentioned in Examples 1–5, such as GRP and IMH `V ,
which are derived from specific views about sets and V. A justification
of such a “set-theoretic” second-order axiom should involve a justifica-
tion of each specific view that it upholds. The examination of such a
justification for each particular case is beyond the scope of this article,
but we would like to point out one crucial advantage of liberal pred-
icativism over strict predicativism: with liberal predicativism, once one
has properly justified a “set-theoretic” axiom, there is no formal con-
straint, such as the ω-inconsistency that troubles strict predicativism,
for introducing relevant admissible predicates and thereby postulating
the axiom. At any rate, the focus of this section is on the desiderata (i)
and (ii), and the results of this section are intended to show that liberal
predicativism is versatile enough to provide a suciently rich mathe-
matical framework for meaningfully investigating those “set-theoretic”
second-order axioms; for example, we should decide to accept or reject
IMH `V on the basis of a careful examination of the maximality thesis
of the universe behind it, and we should not reject it just because the
deducibility in V-logic is undefinable.
Unfortunately, however, liberal predicativism is not a panacea. It is
formally compatible with virtually all possible second-order axioms of
set theory. This is simply because its formal rendering is the same as the
ordinary two-sorted formalization of second-order set theory, and it re-
quires no formal rewriting of set-theorists’ usual discourse about classes,
whereas definabilism, hermeneutic reductionism, and strict predica-
tivism do. However, it upholds a particular conception of classes, and
that conception might be incompatible with a view about classes that
some “set-theoretic” second-order axioms of the kind we mentioned
43Even if one does not accept the particular conception of truth represented by the KF-
axioms, there are other alternative axiomatizations of truth to achieve the same goal, such
as Cantini’s axioms of VF: see Andrea Cantini, “A Theory of Formal Truth Arithmetically
Equivalent to ID1,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, LV, 1 (March, 1990): 244–259.
44 Indeed, the ideas of ∆11-CR, ETR, and the KF-truth originally arose in the context of
the Feferman-Schütte predicativism in the proof theory of arithmetic, and they are given
the same type of justification in that context.
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uphold, even though they are formally compatible. In many cases, in-
cluding Examples 1 and 3–5, there seems to be nothing wrong in inter-
preting classes as predicates of sets; for instance, Audrito and Viale’s
axiom can be interpreted with no problem as an assertion of the exis-
tence of an admissible predicate that describes a winning strategy of a
certain game instructing what move to make in order to win. Liberal
predicativism does well in most cases, when it comes to an axiom as-
serting something about a specific type of class, such as Audrito and
Viale’s. In contrast, if an axiom asserts something strong about the en-
tire structure of classes or the totality of classes, liberal predicativism
might be faced with a diculty. For instance, although it does not im-
ply impredicative comprehension, GRP in Example 2 requires an ex-
traordinarily rich stock of classes and imposes a highly complicated
structure on classes that goes far beyond any understanding of classes
that we could gain from the notion of predicate (or even from that of
mereological part) and/or through standard theories of classes such as
NBG and MK.45 What principle is conceptually compatible with liberal
predicativism depends on what view one holds about the admissibility
of predicates, and we do not think that liberal predicativism is abso-
lutely conceptually incompatible with GRP , but it can be conceptually
compatible with GRP only by taking a quite (and possibly excessively)
strong view on the admissibility of predicates.46
v. nominalism about classes
Nominalism is a primary motivation behind predicativism. Here we
mean nominalism about classes; we do not intend to question realism
45For instance, GRP implies that (V,∈, C) satisfies the axiom of determinacy for light-
face Σ0α class games (suitably defined, say, starting from Σ
0
1-definable open classes) for
any α < ω1; it also implies the existence of a class Z ∈ C that codes a model of boldface
Π1n-determinacy for all n ∈ N in the sense that (V,∈, {(Z)x | x ∈ V}) is a model of
it and MK, where (Z)x denotes {y | 〈x, y〉 ∈ Z}. Here, the collections Σ0α and Π1n of
class games are respectively defined in terms of the Borel hierarchy and the projective
hierarchy of subclasses of the game space <ωV; see Donald Martin, Determinacy of In-
nitely Long Games, unpublished manuscript, Chapter 8. These axioms go far beyond the
strength of full impredicative comprehension, and any higher-order set theory even with
full impredicative comprehension at each order is still far from capturing their strength;
for some details of determinacy of class games, see Sherwood Hachtman, “Determinacy
Separations for Class Games,” to appear in Archive for Mathematical Logic. We remark that
(V,∈, C) satisfies those axioms, since GRP implies the existence of proper class many
measurable Woodin cardinals above the critical point κ and thus makes all projective
games in <ωVκ determined, which makes those axioms true in (Vκ,∈,Vκ+1) and thus
in (V,∈, C) by the asserted elementary embedding j .
46 If GRP is strengthened to the assertion of the existence of an elementary embedding
preserving all second-order formulae, it implies full impredicative comprehension over V
is unlikely to be acceptable from the liberal predicativist point of view.
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about sets nor advocate nominalism about sets here. There are sev-
eral reasons for favoring nominalism (or anti-realism, if preferred) over
realism about classes, and we will discuss them in this section.
First of all, according to Ockham’s razor, parsimony of ontology is in
principle to be respected as far as possible. Second, if a class is another
kind of object independent of sets, then the plethora of uses of classes in
set theory indicate that set theory concerns two distinct kinds of objects.
However, the subject matter of set theory is alleged to consist solely of
sets, and the foundational significance of set theory is largely derived
from the alleged fact that all of mathematics can be expressed in terms
of a single kind of mathematical objects, that is, sets. Hence, the con-
clusion at stake would require a significant change to the shared view of
set theory, and we suspect that many set-theorists would not agree that
their subject matter consists of sets and something else, such as mere-
ological parts of V. Third, if classes are mathematical objects, it seems
that nothing debars us from collecting them into sets, since the subject
matter of set theory is all collections there are at least within mathemat-
ics. This results in a hierarchy of sets starting from classes as urelements
stacked on top of the ordinary hierarchy of (pure) sets, that is, V, which
is a particularly problematic consequence for universism. In advocating
their mereological interpretation, Welch and Horsten are well aware of
this problem of realism about classes, and they cautiously allocate dif-
ferent ontological categories to sets and classes: they take mereological
parts of V (“classes” for them) as objects of some non-mathematical kind
not subsumed under the laws of mathematics, and thereby try to pre-
clude the formation of sets of mereological parts of V. This strategy,
however, makes it completely mysterious why and how sets and classes
can interact with mathematically substantial consequences. With their
two-tiered view, Welch’s GRP would be a super-mathematical assertion of
such a mystic but mathematically productive interplay of the two kinds
of entities living in two completely separate realms. The conclusion we
draw from these considerations is that, for universists, nominalism is
to be preferred with respect to classes as far as possible.
One possible objection to liberal predicativism as a form of nominal-
ism about classes is that its formalism involves second-order quantifiers,
and thus it ontologically commits us to extra objects beyond sets, ac-
cording to the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment “to be is to
be the value of a bound variable.” A general discussion of the criterion
of “objecthood” is beyond the scope of this article, but we do not think
it necessary to accept the Quinean criterion. In regard to its formal
expression of nominalism about classes, liberal predicativism takes the
same strategy as the plural interpretation does, namely, that of inter-
preting second-order quantifiers so that they do not carry ontological
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commitment while keeping the two-sorted formalism.47 In other words,
liberal predicativism generalizes predicate places directly by quantifiers
ranging over (admissible) predicates as such.4849
Liberal predicativism does not license us to accept every possible
second-order axiom in an ontologically noncommittal way. Particularly
and repeatedly, impredicative comprehension seems unacceptable, or,
at best, could only be accepted in an ontologically committal way, for
liberal predicativism. In his critique of the plural interpretation, Lin-
nebo argues that “the considerations that give content to the notion of
a determinate range of arbitrary sub-pluralities belong to combinatorics
and to set theory” and then concludes that, with such a combinatorial
and set-theoretic understanding, pluralities are no more ontologically
innocent or noncommittal than sets.50 We agree with Linnebo’s argu-
ment, and a parallel argument does apply to liberal predicativism, or
predicativism in general, with impredicative comprehension; indeed,
Parsons’s rejection of a determinate totality of possible predicates of
sets and impredicative comprehension for predicates is based on essen-
tially the same consideration.51
In our view, liberal predicativism avoids ontological commitment to
extra objects beyond sets, but it can only do so at the cost of impred-
icative comprehension. If one takes nominalism about all (or most)
mathematical entities and tries to develop mathematics by means of
second- or higher-order logic, then one would surely need impredica-
tive comprehension at some point. However, we repeat that we advo-
cate nominalism about classes and not about sets. All those uses of
47For more extensive discussion (and justification) of nonnominal and ontologi-
cally noncommittal interpretations of second-order quantifiers, see George Boolos, “On
Second-order Logic,” The Journal of Philosophy, LXXII, 16 (September 1975): 509–527,
and Agustin Rayo and Stephen Yablo, “Nominalism Through De-nominalization,” Noûs,
XXXV, 1 (March 2001): 74–92.
48Parsons argues convincingly that not every predicate refers to an object; see Charles
Parsons, “Objects and Logic,” The Monist, LXV, 4 (October 1982): 491–516, at p. 502.
49The reader may notice a similarity between liberal predicativism and the interpreta-
tion of classes as schematic letters, for which any possible open sentence can be substituted,
advocated by McGee; Vann McGee, “HowWe Learn Mathematical Language,” The Philo-
sophical Review, CVI, 1 ( January 1997): 35–68. The same idea is also presented in a more
mathematical form in Feferman, “Reflecting on Incompleteness,” op. cit. With this inter-
pretation, some class quantification can be expressible. However, this strategy seems to
work only for Π11 assertions and not for more complex assertions such as GRP . Parsons’s
treatment of arithmetical induction and the uniqueness of the natural number structure is
based on a similar idea to theirs; see Parsons, “The Uniqueness of the Natural Numbers,”
Iyuun, XXXIX ( January 1990): 13–44.
50Øystein Linnebo, “Plural Quantification Exposed,” Nôus, XXXVII, 1 (March 2003):
71–92.
51Parsons, “Sets and Classes,” op. cit., pp. 216. Also see Charles Parsons, Mathematical
Thought and Its Objects (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), §13 and §47.
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impredicative comprehension for the development of mathematics can
be incorporated into and carried out within set theory, in which impred-
icative comprehension is perfectly acceptable thanks to the axioms of
powerset and separation; as far as the current state of mathematics is
concerned, impredicative comprehension seems unnecessary anywhere
beyond the realm of (the first-order part of) set theory.
To conclude this section, we briefly compare liberal predicativism
and the plural interpretation. They are alleged to share the same philo-
sophical merit of ontological innocence about classes. The proponents
of the latter further contend that the plural interpretation justifies all
instances of impredicative comprehension and thus MK, and thereby
conclude that the plural interpretation is a superior nominalist concep-
tion of classes to the predicative interpretation.52 However, their con-
tention is not convincing, as Linnebo argues. Given that the two share
the same diculty in dealing with impredicative comprehension, we
think that the former is rather better than the latter as a nominalist
theory of classes, since there seems to be no convincing argument that
justifies relatively strong class-theoretic principles such as ETR and LFP
from the viewpoint of the plural interpretation with nominalism about
classes.
vi. conclusion
Predicativism shares the philosophical merit of ontological parsimony
with reductionisms and the plural interpretation. Our liberal predica-
tivism also shares a mathematical merit with realist interpretations of
classes such as the mereological interpretation in that it accommodates
various uses of classes in set theory. Predicativism is not as restric-
tive as has been thought, and rather provides a highly viable option to
nominalists about classes. There is a limitation: predicativism does not
seem to allow impredicative comprehension in general, and it might not
be conceptually compatible with some types of axioms. However, we
believe that the present paper at least shows that predicativism, when
our liberal version is taken, is able to oer a much more versatile and
workable nominalist understanding of classes than previously thought.
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52For example, see Uzquiano, “Plural Quantification and Classes,” op. cit., pp. 76–80.
